Intellectual property and public health: two sides of the same coin by Li, Y
Title Intellectual property and public health: two sides of the samecoin
Author(s) Li, Y
Citation Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy,2011, v. 6 n. 2, p. 389-427
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/142052
Rights
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938267
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
*
 
Yahong Li
**
 
ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property (IP) protection has been blamed as one of 
the main sources of the public health challenge facing society. The 
high prices of patented drugs causes a low rate of access to 
medicine in poor countries. Public health and human rights 
advocates propose to abandon pharmaceutical patents or impose a 
legal duty on pharmaceutical companies to make essential medicines 
accessible. This article investigates the monopoly rights and 
practices in the pharmaceutical field, the gravity of the public health 
problem and the status of patenting and medicine access in 
least-developed countries (LDCs) and developing countries (DLCs), 
and the legal and policy schemes tailored to increase medicine 
access. Based on the analyzes of the findings from the investigation, 
the article argues that a patent is a minor factor for medicine access 
in LDCs, and an important factor in DLCs. But compulsory 
licensing or other practical solutions can reduce its impact, and 
intellectual property and public health, as an integral part of each 
other or two sides of the same coin, are inseparable and mutually 
dependent. IPR provide necessary incentives in drug discovery and 
development for public health, the IP system in turn benefits from 
public health related drug discovery R&D and commercial activities. 
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The relationship between the two should be perceived and 
constructed in a positive, forward looking and pragmatic way, rather 
than mutual condemnation and destruction. Scholars and 
practitioners in both fields should collaborate to have an in-depth 
understanding of the issues, objectives, schemes and practices in the 
two fields, and an objective assessment of the impact each has 
exerted, efforts to reconcile, and positive outcomes achieved. 
KEYWORDS: intellectual property rights, patents, access to essential 
medicines, public health, compulsory licensing, Doha Declaration 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the World Trade Summit in Doha in 2001, the Ministers of 
Health of South Africa and Belgium issued a strong statement noting that 
―[I]t is a crime against humanity for poor people to die because lifesaving 
medicines are too expensive.‖
1
 Many, particularly public health advocates, 
claim that patents are responsible for such a crime because patented 
essential medicines are too expensive and thus not affordable to the poor 
people living in developing countries (DLCs) and least-developed countries 
(LDCs).
2
 Is the patent truly a factor contributing to the public health 
disaster, and, if so, is it the sole or main factor? Are IPRs and public health 
irreconcilable enemies? In other words, must we abandon pharmaceutical 
patent in order to protect public health, or vice versa, is public health 
doomed to suffer at the cost of the existence of patents? Are there any 
positive aspects about the relationship between IPRs and public health, and 
ways to change and improve the negative aspects? In short, can IPRs and 
public health co-exist, as the two sides of the same coin? This article argues 
that IPRs and public health are the two sides of the same coin and can 
co-exist to promote the healthy lives of mankind, if we perceive their 
relationship positively, assess the effects of patents on medicine access 
objectively, and strive to find workable solutions to use IPRs to promote 
public health. 
To support the above arguments, this article will examine the legally 
available monopoly rights in the pharmaceutical field and how 
pharmaceutical companies exercises or abuse these rights to maintain their 
market exclusivity. The article will then identify major public health 
problems such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other epidemics in 
the world, and investigate how pharmaceutical patents interact with or 
affect public health by separately exploring patenting status and medicine 
access in LDCs and DLCs. This will be followed by a study on legal and 
policy schemes aiming to reduce the impact of pharmaceutical patents on 
medicine access to promote generic competition such as no-patent 
protection, experimental use and Bolar-exception, compulsory licensing, 
and parallel importation. The article then analyzes the findings from the 
investigations in preceding sections, assesses the relationship between 
                                                        
1  Mary Ann D. Lansang, Access to Medicines: Reorienting the Research Agenda, 
http://www.novartisfoundation.org/platform/content/element/278/access_research_agenda.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
2 For example, Médecins Sans Frontières [hereinafter MSF] states in its website, ―Many medicines, 
in particular those that are still relatively new such as HIV medicines are too expensive for use in 
poor countries. Patent protection has increased in developing countries and this pushes prices up 
because patents provide a monopoly for the originator company for up to 20 years, blocking 
competition.‖ See Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines: About Us, 
http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
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patents and public health, and explores practical solutions to improve the 
relationship of the two sides and to use intellectual property to promote 
public health. 
II. IP AND MONOPOLY IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD 
A. An Overview 
Patents provide a patent holder a 20-year monopoly right to exclude 
others from using the invention he or she patented. As long as the patent 
holder does not grant authorization, or refuses to license, no one can use the 
invention, except where a compulsory licensing is granted. There are 
typically two kinds of patents: product patents and process patents. Product 
patents confers more powerful protection as it is difficult to invent around a 
product once it is patented, while process patents are easier to be infringed 
as there are multiple routes to produce the same product. Neither the Paris 
Convention nor the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) clearly lists patentable subject matter, except broadly 
stating that a patent is available for ―any inventions, whether product or 
processes, in all fields of technology.‖
3
 Presumably, pharmaceutical 
products and processes are protected by patent because discovery of new 
drugs should be considered a field of technology. Indeed, pharmaceutical 
products and processes are protected in most WTO member states. 
However, under special transitional arrangements in the TRIPS agreement,
4
 
some DLCs and LDCs within the WTO have delayed their patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products for 10 or more years. For example, 
India only started to protect pharmaceutical products in 2005, 10 years after 
TRIPS entered into force, and LDCs are allowed to delay until 2016. We 
will further discuss these special transitional arrangements and their impact 
on developing countries in the latter part of this paper. It is sufficient to 
know that pharmaceutical patents are only effective in the countries where 
                                                        
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – 
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
4 TRIPS Agreement article 65(4) provides, ―To the extent that a developing country Member is 
obliged by this Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so 
protectable in its territory on the general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, as 
defined in paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions on product patents of Section 
5 of Part II to such areas of technology for an additional period of five years.‖ TRIPS article 66(1) 
provides, ―In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, 
their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a 
viable technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this 
Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as 
defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request 
by a least-developed country Member, accord extensions of this period.‖ 
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pharmaceutical patents are protected and granted, and have no effect in 
countries that are not. For example, since pharmaceuticals were not 
protected by patent in India prior to 2005, India was free to produce generic 
versions of the patented antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for a long time. In the 
same way, if some ARV drugs are not filed for patent protection in LDCs, 
these countries are also free to produce these ARV drugs without fear of 
infringement lawsuits. 
B. Patent Term Extensions 
In countries that do have patent protection for pharmaceutical products 
and processes, pharmaceutical companies must obtain authorization or 
licenses from the patent holder to produce the patented drugs, or else they 
may face a lawsuit for patent infringement. Pharmaceutical patent holders, 
mostly multinational pharmaceutical corporations (MPCs), typically file as 
many patents as possible for their new inventions, and fiercely guard 
against any infringement because developing a new drug is both extremely 
expensive and time-consuming. It is estimated that ―of every 5,000 new 
chemical entities (NCEs) screened, on average, only five are tested in 
clinical trials and only one of those is approved for patient use,‖
5
 and the 
cost for putting a new drug on the market is somewhere from US$500 
million to US$800 million, but only about 30% of the patented drugs on the 
market are profitable.
6
 It shall be noted, though, that opponents of 
pharmaceutical patents argue that the figures are exaggerated and many of 
the research projects are funded by public institutions.
7
 In the meantime, 
the time spent on drug discovery and marketing approval is notoriously 
lengthy. About 8-12 years will be spent on clinic trials and the marketing 
approval process before a new drug can be put on the market.
8
 In effect, 
the pharmaceutical companies suffer a significant reduction of the 20 years 
patent term as they typically file their patent applications at a pre-clinical 
stage to protect their new ideas. To compensate for such a loss in patent 
                                                        
5 Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Data Exclusivity in the Context of 
Innovation and Market Access, ICTSC-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for 
Affordable Access to Essential Medicines Bellagio, at 9 (Oct. 12-16, 2004), 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). 
6 Id. 
7 For example, the discoveries of 15 out of 21 drugs (71%) introduced between 1965 and 1992 
were publicly funded. See Prayas & Jan Swastha Abiyan, Medicine Pricing and Universal Access 
to Treatment Fact Sheet, http://www.oxfamindia.org/sites/www.oxfamindia.org/files/Factsheet-_ 
Universal_access_to_medicine.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
8 Clinical trials normally include five stages: a pre-clinical stage and four clinical stages. The 
pre-clinical stage involves the isolation of new chemical compounds, safety tests on animals and 
other studies. The clinical stages involve safety and efficacy trials on human volunteers, and 
regulatory and post-marketing studies. Pharmaceutical companies typically file their patent 
applications at the pre-clinical stage to protect their inventions. See Pugatch, supra note 5, at 4. 
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term, the U.S., EU, Japan and Australia adopted legislation to restore the 
patent term up to five years. To illustrate, EU‘s Supplementary Protection 
Certificate (SPC) system and the U.S.‘ Hatch-Waxman Act are explained 
below. 
The SPC system was created by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1768/92 for medicinal products published on July 2, 1992, was codified 
under Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009, and came into force on July 6, 2009. 
SPC provides an extension of five years of market exclusivity after a patent 
has expired, or 15 years for a designated medicinal product, subject to the 
following conditions: (1) the medicinal product must be authorized for 
marketing; (2) the SPC relates to that medicinal product only, not process 
or other claims in the original patent; (3) the application must be made 
within six months of the grant of the marketing authorization.
9
 
In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration or Hatch-Waxman Act to give generic companies 
considerable leverage in drug market competition and patent litigation by 
creating a ―Bolar exception,‖ which we will discuss later. As a balance, the 
Act also grants patent holders a period of additional market exclusivity by 
restoring the time lost during the regulatory approval. Specifically, it grants 
an extension up to five years, but the total patent term (including the 
restoration period) following FDA approval cannot be longer than 14 years. 
So when the regulatory review period for a new drug is five years, a 
five-year restoration period may be granted. However, if the remaining 
term of a patent is 10 years, only a four-year restoration period is allowed 
even if the review period is five years. 
C. Data Exclusivity 
In addition, pharmaceutical companies also arguably receive extra 
market exclusivity through the protection of test data exclusivity. Test data 
exclusivity is a form of protection given to clinical test data that are used to 
prove safety and efficacy of new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical 
products. During the period of exclusivity, ranging from 5-10 years 
depending on national legislation,
10
 no generic applicant can rely on the 
data for marketing authorization. Under TRIPS Article 39(3), the data 
submitted for the purpose of marketing approval are protected against 
unfair commercial use or disclosure.
11
 It is arguable that this article has 
                                                        
9 Intellectual Property Office, Supplementary Protection Certificate: Guide for Applicants (2009), 
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/spctext.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
10 U.S.: 5 years for new pharmaceutical chemical entities; 3 years for new indications of drugs, and 
12 years for biological products. EU: 8 years (+2 years market exclusivity +1 year for new 
indication). China: 6 years; and Taiwan: 3 (or 5) years. 
11  TRIPS Agreement article 39(3) provides: ―Members, when requiring, as a condition of 
approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
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provided the data holder exclusive right over the test data because, under 
this article, it will be very difficult for a generic company to argue that its 
use of the data is not for commercial purpose, although it may make a case 
that the commercial use is not ―unfair.‖ Since generic companies are 
financially and technically unable to create the test data, the data 
exclusivity may prevent them from entering into the market, as such they 
often complain that data exclusivity is another extension of the 
pharmaceutical patent term.
12
 For instance, the European Generic 
Association argues, ―data exclusivity merely extends the originator 
company‘s market monopoly over a product by not allowing the authorities 
to process an application for marketing authorization.‖
13
 However, a study 
by IMS Health found that ―very few high-selling drugs gain further 
marketing monopoly from the provision afforded by data exclusivity‖ and 
that ―only drugs that do not have granted Supplementary Protection 
Certificates or took an exceptionally long time to traverse the R&D process 
gain significantly from the data exclusivity provisions.‖
14
 The reason for 
this is that market exclusivity protected by patent is normally longer than 
the data exclusivity.
15
 
D. “Authorized Generics” and “Reverse Payment” Settlement 
In recent years, generic companies have become more ―strategically 
proactive and successful‖ in challenging the patents of original drugs.
16
 
For example, India‘s Ranbaxy Laboratories challenged the patent of 
Pfizer‘s Lipitor in Australian court and invalidated one of its patents, 
although it was held to have infringed the basic patent covering 
atorvastatin.
17
 To retaliate against generic companies challenging their 
patents, MPCs adopted a strategy of ―authorized generics‖ which grants 
another ―friendly‖ generic company a license to produce a generic version 
of the original drug.
18
 For instance, a generic company Mylen 
Pharmaceuticals challenged the validity of a patent for Macrobis (for the 
                                                                                                                          
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, 
Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or 
unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.‖ 
12 Pugatch, supra note 5, at 12. 
13 European Generic Association: Data Exclusivity, http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-dataex.htm 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
14 Pugatch, supra note 5, at 13. 
15 For detail discussion on this point, See id. at 13-14. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 Partial Win for Ranbaxy in Lipitor Case v. Pfizer in Australia, 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/partial-win-for-ranbaxy-in-lipitor-case-vs-pfizer-in-australia
/315685/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
18 Pugatch, supra note 5, at 11. 
396 AJWH [VOL. 6:389 
 
 
treatment of urinary tract infections) and therefore was entitled to the 
180-day market exclusivity. The patent holder Procter & Gamble then 
licensed another generic company Watson Pharmaceuticals to manufacture 
a generic version of the drug, thereby stopping Mylen‘s 180-day market 
exclusivity. Mylen sued the FDA for failing to enforce the 180-day market 
exclusivity, but later withdrew the case.
19
 
MPCs also frequently reach settlements with a generic competitor to 
delay generic competition. Specifically, when facing a patent validity 
challenge, the MPCs agree to pay a generic competitor a certain sum of 
money, in return, the generic competitor agrees to delay the date of market 
entry. It is called a ―reverse payment‖ settlement, because in this kind of 
settlement, the patentee pays the alleged infringer, which is opposite to a 
normal settlement scenario where an accused infringer, e.g., generic 
competitor, pays the patentee. Several cases involving ―reverse payment‖ 
settlement have been challenged for antitrust law violations. For example, 
in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG (On Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari 2011), reverse payment settlements are being challenged as 
unlawful under the Sherman Act. Courts are divided on the issue whether 
these kind of settlements are legal. So far, the 2nd Circuit and Federal 
Circuit held that it is legal per se,
20
 while the 11th Circuit held that they 
should be treated under the rule of reason, and the 6th Circuit ruled that 
they are illegal per se.
21
 A group of more than 80 law professors lead by 
Prof. Mark Lemley filed a friend-of-the-court brief to request the Supreme 
Court to hear the case, as they believe that the holding of ―per se legality‖ 
is wrong.
22 
E. Patents for New Use of Known Substances and “Evergreening” 
Patents 
New use (or new therapeutic use or second use) of known substances is 
a practice of pharmaceutical companies to file patents for a new therapeutic 
use discovered from a chemical compound that was used or known for 
another therapeutic purpose. For example, AZT, the first ARV drug for 
HIV/AIDS, was first discovered for the purpose of treating cancer in 1964, 
but it was patented as a drug treating HIV/AIDS in 1985. Another example 
                                                        
19 Id. 
20 They held that the settlement has no antitrust problem unless: (1) patent was obtained by fraud, 
(2) infringement suit has no basis, (3) restrains competition beyond the scope of patent. See CCH 
2010-1 Trade Cases 76,989, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 
(Apr. 29, 2010). 
21  Reverse Payment Settlements Return to the Supreme Court, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/reverse-payment-settlements-return-to-the-supreme-cour
t.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
22 Id. 
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of new use is Viagra (treating erectile dysfunction) over sildenafil citrate 
treating high blood pressure. It is said that new use can substantially reduce 
R&D costs and the risk of unexpected side effects, and that about 40% of 
Pfizer‘s compounds in the development pipeline have a prior known use.
23
 
Obviously, patenting a new use can allow a pharmaceutical company to 
maintain market exclusivity over one chemical compound for two or more 
patent terms. Whether this is allowed and justified, TRIPS gives no 
guidance and national laws are widely divided. Generally, it is supported in 
the developed countries and is suspected or resisted in developing countries. 
In the U.S., inventors can claim a method of use for the novel therapeutic 
use of a known compound under 35 U.S.C. § 287.
24
 In Europe, a special 
novelty exception and a legal construction ―Swiss claim‖ were created to 
allow the first and the second use of known substances.
25
 In developing 
countries, some countries, like South Korea, allow new use patents; some 
countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, are not clear, and others, like 
Kenya and Andean community, specifically prohibit new use patents.
26
 
The U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) report 
recommends, ―Most developing countries, particularly those without 
research capabilities, should strictly exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods from patentability, including new uses of known 
products.‖
27
 
While patenting new use for known substances may be considered as 
legally acceptable, ―evergreening‖ patents are generally perceived as patent 
abuse because the former normally involves a novel use that significantly 
differs from prior use but the latter only involves minor modifications of an 
existing chemical compound. According to a critique, ―Evergreening refers 
to different ways wherein patent owners take undue advantage of the law 
and associated regulatory processes to extend their IP monopoly 
particularly over highly lucrative blockbuster drugs by filing 
disguised/artful patents on an already patent-protected invention shortly 
before expiry of the patent term.‖
28
 A patent application for imatinib 
mesylate filed by Novartis in India was rejected by the Indian patent office. 
                                                        
23 Richard A. Castellano, Patent Law for New Medical Uses of Known Compounds and Pfizer’s 
Viagra Patent, 46 IDEA 283, 285(2006). 
24 Id. at 293. 
25 Pascale Boulet et al., Drug Patents Under the Spotlight: Sharing Practical Knowledge About 
Pharmaceutical Patent, at 15 (2003), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4913e/s4913e.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
26 Id. 
27
 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy, at 50 (2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). 
28 Inderjit Singh Bansal et al., Evergreening: A Controversial Issue in Pharma Milieu, 14(4) J. 
INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 299, 299 (2009). 
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This decision was upheld by the Indian court on the ground that Novartis‘s 
patent application lacked ―significant therapeutic advances‖ over the 
previous version, imatinib, pursuant to amended Indian Patent Law section 
3(d).
29
 
III. PATENTS AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 
There have been many complaints that the cost for accessing medicines 
essential for public health is too high and people in developing countries 
and particularly LDCs cannot afford to purchase the drugs protected by 
patents.
30
 As a result, people suffering HIV/AIDS or other infectious 
diseases have no choice but to wait and die. Take, for example, the price for 
patented ARV combination therapy for AIDS treatment. It used to cost 
more than US$10,000 per patient per year on average, but a generic version 
costs only US$168 per patient per year.
31
 But on the other hand, 
―significant progress has been made in recent years in increasing access to 
HIV treatment in the developing world. Between 2002 and 2010, the 
number of people in developing countries receiving ARV therapy increased 
by more than 2,100%, from fewer than 300,000 to 6.6 million.‖
32
 How 
does one evaluate these two conflicting phenomena? Is the patent the sole 
or main source of the problem in medicine access? Before answering these 
questions, we examine the gravity of public health problems first, and then 
the patenting status of essential medicines in LDCs and DLCs respectively. 
A. The Gravity of the Public Health Problem 
“Public health” is defined in Webster’s Medical Dictionary as “the 
approach to medicine that is concerned with the health of the community as 
a whole.”
33
 The Dictionary also lists three core functions of public health: 
 ―The assessment and monitoring of the health of communities and 
populations at risk to identify health problems and priorities; 
 The formulation of public policies designed to solve identified 
local and national health problems and priorities; 
                                                        
29 Prayas & Abhiyan, supra note 7. See also the discussion in IV-C of this article. 
30  MSF, The Impact of Patents on Access to Medicines, 
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/impact-patents-access-medicines (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
31 Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovations, 20(2) BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1033 (2005). 
32 Gilead Press Release, Gilead Expands Access Program for Medications in Developing World, 
http://investors.gilead.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69964&p=irol-newsarticle&id=1584101 (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2011). 
33  MedicineNet.Com, Definition of Public Health, 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=5120 (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
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 To assure that all populations have access to appropriate and 
cost-effective care, including health promotion and disease 
prevention services, and evaluation of the effectiveness of that 
care.‖
34
 
The public health problems that were identified by the WTO in its 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [hereinafter 
Doha Declaration] include HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, which particularly afflict developing and LDCs.
35
 In order to 
assess how IP affects public health, we must first understand how grave the 
medicine access problem is in these areas. 
1. HIV/AIDS. — According to UNAIDS‘ statistics, in 2009, the 
number of people living with HIV was 33.3 million among which 22.5 
million were living in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 4.1 million living in South 
and South-east Asia.
36
 ―Since the beginning of the epidemic, more than 60 
million people have been infected with HIV and nearly 30 million people 
have died of HIV-related causes.‖
37
 The disease is treated by Highly 
Active Anti-retroviral Therapy (HAART), which is not a cure but reduces 
infection and prolongs life. However, HAART is very costly and not 
widely available outside of developed countries. Among 25 million 
HIV-positive Africans, only about 25,000 or just one in 1,000 receive one 
ARV drug.
38
 In 2009, 5.2 million people with HIV in low- and 
medium-income countries had access to ARV drugs, up from 700,000 in 
2004, but 10 million still do not have access.
39
 
2. Tuberculosis. — It is estimated that one-third of the world‘s 
population is currently infected with the TB bacillus, and 5-10% of people 
who are infected with TB bacilli become sick or infectious.
40
 Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the largest population of TB patients, with over 350 cases per 
100,000 people, and the South-east Asia region comes in second, with 35% 
of the global cases in 2008.
41
 It was estimated that 1.7 million people died 
                                                        
34 Id. 
35 Ministerial Conference, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, art.1, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
36 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [hereinafter UNAIDS], The Global AIDS 
Epidemic, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/factsheet/2010/20101123_FS_Glo
bal_em_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
37 Id. 
38 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to 
AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286(15) JAMA 1886, 1890 (2001). 
39 UNAIDS, supra note 36. In 2009, in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 3.9 million HIV infected were 
receiving ART, while 10.6 million were still in need of ART. 
40  WHO, Tuberculosis, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs104/en/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
41 Id. 
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from TB in 2009, of which mostly are people in Africa.
42
 The increase of 
TB was partly cause by the emergence of HIV as the virus weakens the 
immune system. The two most powerful anti-TB drugs are isoniazid and 
rifampicin, but more and more patients started to become resistant to both 
of them due to inconsistent or partial treatment.
43
 The drug resistance can 
be treated with chemotherapy and second-line anti-TB drugs that are more 
expensive. Right now, the WHO has launched The Global Plan to Stop TB 
2010-2015, which set targets to reduce TB prevalence and death rates by 
50% by 2015 and eliminate TB as a public health problem by 2050.
44
 
3. Malaria. — The WHO estimated that, in 2008, there were 247 
million cases of malaria and nearly one million deaths, mostly among 
African children, of whom one will die of malaria every 45 seconds.
45
 It is 
also estimated that 59% of the world‘s clinical malaria cases occur in Africa, 
38% in Asia and 3% in the Americas.
46
 Malaria can decrease GDP by as 
much as 1.3% in countries having high levels of transmission, and health 
costs are up to 40% of public health expenditures.
47
 Although curable, the 
disease could be fatal if not treated promptly. The best available treatment 
is artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). However, artemisinin has 
increasingly become resist, which may cause a serious health crisis ―as no 
alternative antimalarial medicines will be available in the near future.‖
48
 
The 2002 statistics show that the cost for the treatment with antimalarial 
drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa was well below US$1, and the cost of ACTs 
was in the range US$1-3.50 per adult treatment.
49
 But the price difference 
between a brand name product and its generic version is huge. For example, 
per-tablets prices of mefloquine varied from a low of US$0.54 for a generic 
product in Uganda to US$8.10 for a brand-name product in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, and the private sector prices for artemisinin 
monotherapy compounds in Kenya ranged between US$5 and 7 per adult 
treatment.
50
 A new antimalarial drug, malrone, has been launched for 
prophylaxis and treatment, but it is not affordable for most of malaria 
endemic countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
51
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Malaria has been eliminated in many countries such as the United 
States, but the effort to eradicate it in Africa has been a failure. The best 
way to reduce malaria transmission, as the WHO suggested, is vector 
control such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets and indoor spraying with 
residual insecticides.
52
 However, mosquitoes too have developed 
resistance to insecticides over time, and developing new, alternative 
insecticides is an expensive and long process.
53
 
B. Patent Status and Medicine Access in Least-developed Countries 
From the above statistics, we know that the access rate for drugs 
treating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in LDCs is extremely low. 
The question is whether this low access rate is caused by patent or by other 
factors. According to a study by Attaran and Gillespie-White, among the 15 
antiretroviral drugs treating AIDS which are patented by MPCs such as 
GSK, Roche, BMS, Merck, BI, Abbott and Agouron, only very few (e.g., 4) 
are patented in most of African countries, with one exception that 13 out of 
15 drugs were filed for patents in South Africa, and among total 795 
patents filed, only 172 (21.6%) actually exist.
54
 They concluded that patent 
is not to be blamed for the lack of access to ARV drug treatment in most 
African countries, because the ―scarcity of treatment cannot rationally be 
ascribed to antiretroviral patents that are few – or nonexistent – in most 
African countries. Other factors, and especially the ubiquitous poverty of 
African countries, must be more to blame.‖
55
 They further listed the 
non-patent barriers for access to antiretroviral treatment in Africa as: 
insufficient finances to purchase; lack of political will; poor medical care 
and infrastructure; inefficient drug regulatory procedures that exclude 
competing products from the marketplace; and high tariffs and sales 
taxes.
56
 
The authors of the above study emphasized that their conclusion only 
applies to ARV drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa,
57
 but not to other types of 
drugs in other regions. Indeed, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is one 
exception to the general rule as the authors pointed out, that is, MPCs had 
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filed and received many patents in South Africa. This resulted in a 
legislation of South Africa‘s Medicines Act 1997 authorizing the Minister 
of Health to revoke patents on HIV/AIDS medicines and to allow broad 
compulsory licensing to produce generic version of HIV/AIDS drugs and 
parallel importation for the cheapest patented medicines. In response, the 
South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 39 MPCs 
sued the South Africa government in February 1998, seeking to revoke the 
Act on the ground that it has violated the South African Constitution and 
the TRIPS Agreement. Three years later in March 2001, the lawsuit was 
withdrawn under tremendous international condemnation. 
C. Patent Status and Medicine Access in Developing Countries 
In other regions, such as Asia and South American countries, the 
situation may be different. The MPCs do seek patent protection in the 
countries of these regions that are mostly developing countries with 
manufacturing capacity for producing generic drugs. 
For example, in July 1992, Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) filed a patent 
application for formulation of an ARV drug didanosine in Thailand and 
received the patent in January 1998. Only three months after the patent was 
granted, Thailand‘s Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) 
launched a generic didanosine 150mg tablets. In May 2001, the AIDS 
Access Foundation and two patients with HIV-1 in Thailand filed a lawsuit 
against BMS in the Thai Central IP and International Trade Court on the 
ground that BMS‘ patent application for didanosine had intentionally 
omitted the dose restriction. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in 
October 2002. The central issue in the case was whether an individual has 
the right to challenge a patent. BMS argued that the plaintiffs ―do not have 
the objective to manufacture didanosine, and can choose other medicines to 
cure the disease, and are therefore not injured or interested parties.‖
58
 The 
court in its final verdict, however, ruled that ―medicine is one of the 
fundamental factors necessary for human beings, as distinct from other 
products or other inventions that consumers may or may not choose for 
consumption,‖ that ―injured parties . . . are not limited to manufacturers or 
sellers of medicines protected by patent.‖ Those in need of the medicine are 
also interested parties to the granting of the patent, and that TRIPS should 
be ―interpreted and implemented so as to promote the rights of members to 
protect public health, especially the promotion and support of access to 
medicines.‖
59
 It was believed that ―the ruling has set an important 
precedent that essential drugs are not just another consumer product but a 
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human right, and that patients are injured by patents.‖
60
 
Another patent for ARV drug was also filed and met opposition in 
Thailand. GSK had attempted several times (in 1997 and 2006 respectively) 
to patent its ARV drug, Combid, in Thailand, but had to withdraw its 
application due to opposition from HIV/AIDS advocates.
61
 Thailand‘s 
GPO has been producing a generic version of Combid known as Zilarvir, 
and about 4,000 out of the 100,000 HIV-positive people in the country each 
paid $38 monthly for the generic version.
62
 In fact, GPO had been 
producing seven generic ARV drugs that are 2-25 times cheaper than the 
brand equivalents.
63
 
In Brazil, the government launched a program to provide universal 
access to antiretroviral therapy in the late 1990s. In 2008, a patent 
application filed by Gilead Sciences for the drug tenofovir disproxil 
fumarate (TDF) was rejected by the Brazilian Patent Office on the ground 
that it lacked inventiveness.
64
 This decision was considered very important 
for Brazil‘s AIDS patients because there were about 31,000 people 
receiving TDF under the government‘s treatment program, and TDF was 
produced by India‘s generic companies at a tenth of the price for the brand 
equivalent: US$158 for one patient yearly, compared to the US$1,387 
charged by Gilead in Brazil.
65
 Without patent protection in Brazil, TDF 
can be freely produced by local generic companies or imported from India. 
India represents a very interesting case on medicine access. The 
country has the second highest number of HIV infections in the world, and 
is one of the few countries enjoying low drug pricing due to the lack of 
product patent protection for drugs prior to 2005, and yet ―access still 
remains denied to the large number of HIV positive persons.‖
66
 
―Healthcare expenditure is the second greatest cause of rural indebtedness 
in India today . . . between 1999-2000, 32.5 million patients fell below the 
poverty line after just a single hospitalization . . . WHO estimates that 65% 
of India‘s population lacks regular access to essential medicines.‖
67
A 
commentator attributes the inaccessibility to factors such as ―poverty, 
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existing public health policies, the drug pricing regulation, obligations 
under TRIPS to amend the patent laws and lack of knowledge of the 
fundamental right to health.‖ Take pricing as an example, it was said that 
the Indian Government had been reluctant to have price control over drugs 
arguing that generic competition should be adequate to lower prices, as a 
result, ―prices can remain quite high even for ‗generic medicines,‘ with 
[generic] companies still able to skim enormous mark-ups from bulk to 
individual retail price.‖
68
 The situation may be worsened by the 2005 
amendment to the patent law introducing product patents for drugs. To 
ensure its generic competition right after patent expiration and to prevent 
―everygreening‖ medicines, India amended section 3(d) in its 2005 patent 
law, requiring patents to represent significant therapeutic advances over 
previous versions of a medicine.
69
 This provision was applied by the 
Indian Patent Office (Chennai Patent Office) to reject a patent application 
filed by Novartis for imatinib mesylate, a blood cancer treatment drug 
based on an earlier version imatinib. Novartis challenged this decision, as 
well as the constitutionality of section 3(d), at the Madras High Court. 
Novartis claimed that section 3(d) was not in compliance with Article 27 of 
TRIPS because it gave unguided discretionary powers to the Patent 
Controller to reject the patent applications on the ground that there was no 
invention. The court did not accept Novartis‘ contention. 
According to an MSF‘s study, China also faces the problem of access 
to essential medicines due to drug choice restrictions, lack of availability of 
key second-line drugs and the inability to take advantage of voluntary 
differential pricing.
70
 China has about 840,000 HIV positive people, 
80,000 of whom are living with AIDS by a 2005 estimation.
71
 The 
government has been able to provide free antiretroviral drugs to these 
patients since 2003 thanks to domestic generic production. But these drugs 
(d4+, ddl and NVP) have high toxicity and the WHO recommended the use 
of lamivudine (3TC) which was available in 2004 when China reached a 
supply agreement with GSK, the patent holder of 3TC.
72
 But the supply 
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still could not satisfy the need.  In addition, the effective fixed-dose 
combination (FDC) of d4T/3TC/NVP could not be manufactured or sold in 
China because of the patent on 3TC.
73
 Many second-line antiretroviral 
drugs (tenofovir, lopinavir/ritonavir, saquinavir, nelfinavir, and ritonavir) 
which can solve the resistance problem of first-line drugs are also not 
available in China because the patent holders of these drugs do not market 
them in China.
74
 As a lower-middle income country, China does not have 
the privilege to enjoy ―differential pricing‖ as the LDCs do.
75
 MSF 
attributes the access problem in China mainly to patents, but another study 
by a group of Chinese researchers shows that the obstacle is created by the 
Chinese pharmaceutical companies‘ reluctance to produce essential 
medicines as these medicines are not perceived as profitable because of low 
demand and price and mark-up controls.
76
 For example, manufacturers in 
Shangdong and Gansu provinces choose not to produce 40% of the 
essential drugs listed on the 2004 NEML (National Essential Medicine List) 
even though they are licensed to produce these essential medicines. 
Hospitals also store and prescribe less essential medicines due to their lack 
of clinical use and profitability compared to other medicines such as 
antibiotics.
77
 
IV. SCHEMES LIMITING MONOPOLY RIGHTS 
Intellectual property in essence is a kind of monopoly right and this 
right, if not restrained, could be abused as shown in the above section. 
Therefore, for centuries international organizations and national 
governments have been seeking ways to restrict IPRs within certain limits, 
and counter-balance measures to prevent the abuses of IPRs. Particularly in 
the pharmaceutical and public health areas, these measures include: not 
protecting product patents, experimental exceptions or ―Bolar exception,‖ 
compulsory licensing, and parallel importation. 
A. No-patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products 
Prior to the implementation of the TRIPS agreement, most developing 
countries did not provide patent protection to pharmaceutical products. A 
study of WIPO in 1988 showed that of the 98 state parties to the Paris 
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Convention, 49 excluded pharmaceutical products from patent protection.
78
 
The TRIPS agreement required all WTO member states to provide 20 years 
of patent protection to any inventions, both products and processes. 
However, minding the economic gap between developed countries and 
less-developed countries, the agreement made special transitional 
arrangements for DLCs to delay product patent protection for an additional 
10 years, and for LDCs to delay until 2016.
79
 This arrangement, however, 
can be taken away by some TRIPS-plus arrangements such as FTAs and 
the U.S. threats of trade retaliation. For example, China, Brazil and 
Thailand were forced to amend their patent laws to provide patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products before the due date of their special 
transitional period. But India is a good example of taking advantage of this 
arrangement to allow its generic drug companies to produce a generic form 
as soon as a new brand-drug is put on the market and to not only meet its 
domestic demand of access to medicines but also export to countries with 
similar demand. 
B. Experimental Use and Bolar Exception 
Research and experimental use is allowed under the TRIPS 
agreement
80
 and patent laws in many countries
81
 because early disclosure 
enabling the public to learn about newly discovered technology is the 
trade-off of a patent holder for receiving the monopoly granted by the 
government. Not allowing research and experimental use will eventually 
stifle the original purpose of the patent system. As a report remarks, ―a key 
public policy purpose underlying patent laws is to facilitate the 
dissemination and advancement of technical knowledge and that allowing 
the patent owner to prevent experimental use during the term of the term of 
the patent would frustrate part of the purpose of the requirement that the 
nature of the invention be disclosed to the public.‖
82
 
Referring to the public health area, the WHO‘s 2008 Global Strategy 
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and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property 
had also specifically recognized that a research exception could help to 
address public health needs in developing countries.
83
 
Most countries exempt research and experimental use for 
non-commercial purpose from patent infringement. For example, a U.S. 
court held in Peppenhausen v. Falke that ―no doubt is now well settled, that 
an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a 
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an 
infringement of the right of the patentee.‖
84
 In 2002, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled in Madey v. Duke University that 
experimental research, using a patented product without patent holder‘s 
consent, constitutes patent infringement where the use was to further ―the 
infringer‘s legitimate business‖ interests.
85
 In the U.K., the High Court of 
England and Wales (patent court) held in CoreValve Inc. v. Edwards 
Lifesciences AG & Anor that it is when the preponderant purpose of the 
research is to generate revenue, that the claim of infringement cannot be 
avoided. For example, when the user of the patented invention starts to sell 
samples of his product for profit, his use is not exempted under the research 
and experiment exception.
86
 
From the above cases, we can see that the courts in different 
jurisdictions have been trying to differentiate commercial and 
non-commercial uses when applying the research and experimental use 
exception. However, the following exception concerns the situation when 
the use is for pure commercial purposes, but the marketing of the product 
only starts after the patent term expires. As mentioned above, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act not only extend patent monopoly rights by restoring 
the patent term for the patent holders, but also created a ―Bolar exception‖ 
for generic companies to give the latter more leverage in market 
competition. Specifically, this exception allows generic companies to use 
the patented invention to obtain marketing approval without the patent 
holder‘s permission so that they can market their product as soon as the 
patent expires. 
The exception is called the ―Bolar exception‖ because it was developed 
based on a case, Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733 F.2d 858 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). In this case, Bolar, a generic drug manufacturer, used 
Roche‘s patented chemical, Valium, in its experiments to decide whether its 
generic product was a bioequivalent to Valium in order to obtain FDA 
approval. Roche sued Bolar for patent infringement, but Bolar argued that 
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its use of the patented product was under the experimental use exception of 
the U.S. patent law. Bolar also argued that public policy favors the 
availability of generic drugs immediately following patent expiration, thus 
justifies the experimental use of the patented chemical to determine the 
bioequivalence of the generic version, and denying such use would extend 
patent holder‘s monopoly beyond the patent term. The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) rejected Bolar‘s arguments and held that the 
experimental use exception does not apply when the use is for commercial 
purpose. Since Bolar intended to sell its generic product in competition 
with Roche immediately after Roche‘s patent expired, the exception does 
not apply. The CAFC also held that the policy issue whether the public 
policy favoring the availability of generic drug immediately after patent 
expiration justifies Bolar‘s use should be decided by Congress, rather than 
by court. Shortly after the case, the U.S. Congress did pass the law, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, to allow use of patented products in experiments for 
the purpose of obtaining FDA approval. The law was codified as Section 
171(e)(1) of the Patent Act. It reads, ―[i]t shall not be an act of infringement 
to make, use, offer to sell within the United States or import into the U.S. a 
patented invention . . . solely for uses related to the development and 
submission under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or 
sale of drugs or veterinary biological product.‖ 
In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act also grants 180 days of market 
exclusivity to generic drugs, based on successful patent challenges.
87
 
Between 1998 and 2001 the FDA granted 180 days of market exclusivity to 
more than 31 generic drugs.
88
 This 180-day exclusivity, however, can be 
offset by the ―authorized generic‖ arrangement between patent holder and 
another generic company, as discussed in II-D above. 
C. Compulsory Licensing 
A compulsory license is a license granted by the government allowing 
the use of an intellectual property right without the IP holder‘s consent. 
Compulsory licenses are normally used for copyright and patents, not for 
trademarks, and require payment of certain amounts of royalties from 
licensees to IP holders. Compulsory licenses are granted only under certain 
conditions such as ―for public non-commercial use,‖ ―to correct 
anti-competitive practices,‖ ―for the demand of domestic market,‖ ―national 
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emergency‖ and ―extreme urgency.‖
89
 In the case of public health, 
compulsory licenses can be granted only when there is a public health crisis, 
and ―public health crises including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.‖
90
 This was 
confirmed in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health [hereinafter Doha Declaration] adopted at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference on November 14, 2001. 
1. “Doha Declaration” and “Paragraph 6 System.” — The Doha 
Declaration was adopted specifically for dealing with public health 
problems faced by developing and least-developed countries. Paragraph 1 
of the declaration ―recognize[s] the gravity of the public health problem 
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those 
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.‖ 
Paragraph 4 further affirms that the TRIPS agreement ―can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members‘ 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.‖ The historical significance of the declaration reflected 
not only in its recognition of the gravity of the public health problems in 
those countries, but also in its recognition of the problem that ―WTO 
members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing,‖ and its instruction for the TRIPS Council to find 
―an expeditious solution‖ to the problem.
91
 
Following this instruction, in August 2003, a TRIPS Council adopted a 
system to implement the instructions under Doha Declaration paragraph 6, 
and was thus called the ―Paragraph 6 system.‖
92
 Specifically, this system 
works in the following way: it waives the obligation in TRIPS Article 31(f) 
that requires that the production of pharmaceutical products under 
compulsory license must be ―predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market,‖ therefore allowing countries which have manufacturing capacity 
to export the drugs produced under compulsory license to countries which 
do not have manufacturing capacity. This waiver in theory could solve the 
problem stated in Doha Declaration paragraph 6 that ―WTO members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing.‖ In 
practice, however, the system may not have worked as ideally as its creator 
expected. So far, only one pair of countries has utilized the ―Paragraph 6 
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system‖ since its adoption in 2003, that is, Canada as an exporting country 
and Rwanda as an importing country, for the medicine of Apo-TriAvir, an 
HIV antiretroviral drug.
93
 Some attribute the under-use of the system to the 
complexity of its procedures.
94
 For example, Canada passed the Jean 
Chretien Pledge to Africa Act
95
 to implement Canada‘s Access to 
Medicines Regime (CAMR), which allows Canada to export essential 
medicine produced under a compulsory license to countries without 
manufacturing capacity. But when MSF placed an order with a Canadian 
generic company to produce Triple FDC-AZT/3TC/NVP for exporting 
purposes, they encountered some difficulties: (1) no eligible importing 
country was willing to notify the TRIPS Council because the drug was 
already available from India at a cheaper price and it is difficult to for these 
countries to get a compulsory license, (2) lengthy and troublesome dealings 
with the Canadian health authorities as well as the generic company. In the 
end, no pills were exported.
96
 However, Canada, the first and the only user 
of the system, defended the system in its ―intervention‖ to the WTO TRIPS 
Council relating to the review of the Paragraph 6 system delivered on 
October 27, 2010. After describing how the system worked in the 
Canada-Rwanda case and confirming that Canada‘s CAMR and WTO‘s 
Paragraph 6 system are ―efficient, effective and timely,‖
97
 the Canadian 
―intervention‖ attributes the under-use of the system to the fact that there 
have been more options available to importing countries since the adoption 
of the system, e.g., ―the international environment for procurement of drugs 
has changed significantly with the introduction of a variety of global 
mechanisms and alliances now offering greater choice to countries to 
obtain medicines.‖
98
 In fact, the Canadian ―intervention‖ calls for future 
evaluation of the role of the ―Paragraph 6 system‖ in a ―broad global 
context‖, and consider it as ―a part of broader international strategy to 
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combat diseases that impact developing country.‖ The above cases 
involving MSF and Canada – Rwanda indicate that, although the system 
could work well theoretically, its role in practice is limited. It was not as 
―expeditious‖ as required in the declaration as it took the Canadian generic 
company, Apotex, three years to supply the medicine, even though the 
Canadian government claimed that the system was ―efficient‖ and 
―effective‖.
99
 As one commentator put it, ―the [―Paragraph 6‖] system 
could only play a supportive role in the wider effort to improve access to 
essential medicines.‖
100
 
Interestingly, although paragraph 8 of the declaration requires that the 
TRIPS Council conduct an annual review of the functioning of the system, 
and the annual review had been dutifully conducted,
101
 little has been 
found about why the system has been used only once in eight years since 
its introduction. In general, developing countries such as India and Brazil 
attributed the under-use to the troublesome procedure of the system without 
providing more concrete evidence, while developed countries such as 
Canada and Australia insisted that the fact that the system has been used 
once should not imply a failure of the system since there were other ways 
to obtain medicines.
102
 Indeed, since the system is ―demand-driven,‖ it was 
suggested that more studies were needed to find why potential importers 
did not procure under its auspices.
103
 It seems that ―a wider discussion on 
legal, procedural, commercial or other obstacles to the ‗effective operation‘ 
of the Paragraph 6 system,‖ as asked by India government, is certainly a 
must.
104
 
Notwithstanding the under-use of the ―Paragraph 6 system,‖ the waiver 
of the ―domestic market‖ requirement for the production of generic 
medicine under compulsory license has been made permanent in TRIPS 
Article 31bis by the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement in 2005. The 
amendment will come into force after the ratification by two-thirds of WTO 
members. The deadline for the ratification has been postponed several 
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times from 2007, 2009, and lastly, December 31, 2011. By May of 2011, 
only 34 member states (22% of the total) have ratified. Thirteen members 
have amended their IP laws to implement the TRIPS amendment.
105
 The 
slow ratification process indicates that the majority of WTO members are 
still not ready to make a commitment to the new system. In fact, an interest 
group, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), urged the South African 
Parliament not to ratify the amendment, arguing that the new system is 
―deeply flawed, and arguably incapable of properly solving the problem 
identified in paragraph 6 itself;‖ and that ―it is unclear what benefits, if any, 
arise from formal ratification of the proposed amendment to the TRIPS 
agreement.‖
106
 
2. Post-Doha Development. — Although ―Paragraph 6 system‖ is 
not widely used, countries do issue compulsory licenses to produce generic 
medicines. Brazil and Thailand are said to be one of the few developing 
countries that have achieved universal access to antiretroviral therapy 
through compulsory licensing or other means.
107
 The success was 
attributed to the following three factors: legislation for free access to 
treatment; public sector capacity to manufacture medicines; and strong civil 
society support for government initiatives to improve access.
108
 
―Price negotiations, backed by the threat of compulsory licensing and 
local generic production‖ have been Brazil‘s main strategy to lower the 
price of antiretroviral drugs.
109
 As early as 2001-2003, the Brazilian 
government already used compulsory licensing as a threat to negotiate price 
reduction for antiretroviral drugs. As a result, price reductions were 
obtained at 73% for efavirenz, 56% for kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) and 
74% for nelfinavir.
110
 On June 24, 2005, Brazil announced it would issue a 
compulsory license to produce kaletra, which led to a price negotiation with 
Abbott to reduce the price to US$1,380 per patient per year for the old 
version and US$1,518 for the heat-stable version. In return, the Brazilian 
government agreed to limit the use of compulsory license, and to have a 
moratorium on future price negotiations until 2011.
111
 This concession was 
challenged by civil society groups in a lawsuit asking for the grant of 
compulsory licenses, but the case was prevented from moving forward by 
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the judges on the ground that a compulsory licensing will result in the U.S. 
retaliation while Brazil does not have the capacity for local production.
112
 
Then on April 25, 2007, the Brazilian government issued its first 
compulsory license for efavirenz. But the patent holder, Merck, was only 
willing to offer a 2% discount on the current price (US$580 per 
patient/year). Therefore, Brazil decided to buy a generic version of 
efavirenz from India at less than US$170 per patient/year at first, and then 
start local production later.
113
 
In the meantime, Thailand also issued compulsory licenses for 
efavirence, kaletra and plavix. As a result, Sanofi-Aventis offered Thailand 
a ―special access program‖ to provide a cheaper version of Plavix, but 
Thailand awarded a contract for two million pills of a generic version of 
Plavix to an Indian drug company, Emcure. Sanofi responded to this deal 
by threatening to sue Emcure for patent infringement if the pills were 
imported into Thailand.
114
 However, at the time of writing, no action by 
Sanofi has been taken. In addition, Thailand also threatened to issue 
compulsory licenses for another four drugs: Glivec, Femara, Tarceva and 
Taxotere, for the purpose of negotiating prices with MPCs. The Thai 
government required that the price of patented drugs cannot be more than 
5% over the generic cost. It is arguable that Thailand had used the threat of 
compulsory licensing too broadly because whether cancer may be qualified 
as public health problem and justified for using compulsory licensing is 
questionable. The EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, in a letter 
addressed to Thailand‘s Minister of Commerce, said that such a policy 
―would be detrimental to the patent system and so to innovation and the 
development of new medicines,‖ and ―neither the TRIPS nor the Doha 
Declaration appear to justify a systematic policy of applying compulsory 
licences wherever medicines exceed certain prices.‖
115
 
D. Parallel Importation 
In addition to compulsory licensing, TRIPS also allows parallel 
importation of patented products under the Doctrine of Exhaustion.
116
 It is 
recommended that the latter is a better solution to the drug access problem 
                                                        
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Managing Intellectual Property Weekly News – September 24, 2007, More Drugs Under Threat 
in Thailand, http://www.tginfo.com/sites/default/files/drugs_under_threat_TH.pdf (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011). 
115 Letter from Peter Mandelson, to Krirk-krai Jirapaet, Thailand‘s Minister of Commerce (July 10, 
2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip_static/documents/ 
mandelson07102007.pdf?rd=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
116 TRIPS Agreement article 6 provides that: ―For the purposes of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.‖ 
414 AJWH [VOL. 6:389 
 
 
because it works for developing countries and LDCs without domestic 
manufacturing capacity; it is legally allowed without extra conditions 
imposed; it does not require government‘s approval; and it is exempted 
from a WTO dispute settlement challenge.
117
 The only problem with 
parallel imports is the difficulties in finding low-priced drugs.
118
 The 
―Paragraph 6 system‖ was designed to solve this problem as the generic 
companies of a foreign country can produce and export, under a 
compulsory license, the low-priced drugs to a country without 
manufacturing capacity. However, as discussed above, the ―Paragraph 6 
system‖ has only been used once since its creation. Therefore, how to use 
the parallel importation to solve medicine access problem still requires 
further research. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. IPRs and Public Health: Two Sides of the Same Coin 
The IP system was created originally not to promote public interests, 
but primarily to protect the private property rights of 
inventors/manufacturers. This is manifested by the fact that early IP laws 
mostly only granted the IP holder exclusive rights in using his/her IPRs 
without paying much attention to public interest. This position was justified 
by various theories. For instance, natural right theory justifies IPRs as a 
man‘s natural property right in his own idea which is exclusive and 
inalienable; labor theory justifies IPRs as a reward for the labor invested by 
inventor in the invention; personality theory justifies IPRs as personhood of 
the inventor; utilitarian theory justifies IPRs as incentives for innovation,
119
 
and economic analysis of law justifies IPRs as a way to address the 
problem of market failure in stopping ―free-riding‖ of invisible 
knowledge.
120
 Although there were limitations such as compulsory 
licensing in earlier IP regimes like the Paris Conventions, it was not until 
the TRIPS agreement that public interest started to receive serious attention. 
On the one hand, TRIPS emphasizes that IPRs are ―private rights,‖ and 
there is a ―need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
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property rights.‖
121
 On the other hand, it also recognizes ―the underlying 
public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of 
intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives.‖
122
 It further sets out objectives noting that ―the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should [be] . . . in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations,‖
123
 and posits that ―members may . . . adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.‖
124
 The Doha Declaration and ―Paragraph 6 
system‖ provide practical ways to make the compulsory licensing system 
more workable to solve the problem of access to essential medicines and 
public health, albeit not very successful. 
Therefore, it may be appropriate to say that public interest has become 
an integral part of the IP system. Applying this thought to the context of 
this paper, we could say that public health is also an integral part of the IP 
system, or put it in another way, public health and IP are two sides of the 
same coin, which can not only co-exist but must be mutually dependent. 
On the one hand, the patent system is crucial to provide necessary 
incentives to invest in discovery of essential drugs for public health as there 
is a long lead time, high investment and entry barriers in the drug discovery 
process. Without patents, many essential drugs may have never been 
discovered in the first place, and thus public health may have even suffered 
more severely. In fact, it was suggested that the Doha Declaration, the 
―Paragraph 6 system‖ and sharp cuts to patent-protected prices for 
HIV/AIDS medicines in developing countries have ―threatened the erosion 
of patent rights,‖ which ―leads to the deterioration of pharmaceutical 
companies‘ incentives to further develop HIV/AIDS medicines,‖ and 
―pharmaceutical firms would shift their emphasis of research and 
development to higher-profit medicines for affluence-related diseases such 
as rheumatism.‖
125
 Actual decrease of patent filing at USPTO for 
HIV/AIDS drugs post-Doha Declaration has been recorded, e.g., 319 were 
filed in 2002, while only 276 were filed in 2003.
126
 Specifically as to 
discovery of new drugs for tuberculosis, the situation is very worrying. A 
study conducted in 2000 by D. Chang Blanc and P. Nunn for the WHO 
shows that in the 28 years prior to 2000, only one new anti-tuberculosis 
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drug has come on the market despite nearly 3 million deaths from the 
diseases each year.
127
 The major disincentives for MPCs to develop 
anti-tuberculosis drugs include: the high costs of drug development; the 
risk of patent violations; strong pricing pressure from the WHO; the 
availability of the current cost-effective treatment that may force down the 
price of any new drug.
128
 All of these disincentives are relevant to financial 
return. Simply put, without financial return, no company would be willing 
to invest in a scientifically challenging, lengthy and costly drug discovery 
process. Since tuberculosis affects primarily DLCs and LDCs, most 
patients cannot afford to purchase the drugs even at a low price; the WHO 
will pressure MPCs to lower the price or give it out for free; no patent 
protection or disrespect for patents will lead to generic competition that 
eventually drives MPCs out of the market.
129
 
On the other hand, an enormous amount of patents have been granted 
for the discovery of essential medicines in the area of public health, which 
not only benefits the pharmaceutical companies commercially and the 
medical society scientifically, but also the IP system itself. Through 
granting patent rights to inventors of new drugs that can save millions of 
lives, the IP system attained a higher and nobler objective and is more 
justified. Of course, patent rights can be easily abused by individual patent 
holders and are frequently condemned when this happens. Therefore, a 
carefully designed pharmaceutical patent system is needed to balance the 
demand of public health for non-diminished patent-incentivised new drug 
R&D on one side of the coin and the need of pharmaceutical companies 
having IPR protection on the other side of the coin. To create such a 
balanced system, we must have an objective assessment of the impact of 
patents on medicine access, and find practical solutions for solving both the 
problem of medicine access and the conflicts between IP and public health. 
B. Impact of Patents on Medicine Access: Objective Assessment 
From the discussions in the preceding sections, we can see that public 
health problems involving HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and other 
epidemic diseases have become increasingly grave, but access to essential 
medicines to prevent and treat these diseases still presents a serious 
challenge. IPRs are monopoly rights that can have a negative impact on 
medicine access and public health if they are not properly limited and 
balanced, which are manifested by case studies in developing countries 
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such as Thailand, Brazil, South Africa and China in which MPCs‘ patents 
on essential medicines for the purpose of preventing local generic 
competition have, to some extents, created an impediment to medicine 
access. The drug patents can even be abused by MPCs to make their term 
of exclusivity lengthier or ―everygreen‖ using various patent strategies. 
 On the other hand, blaming patents as the sole or main source of 
inaccessibility of essential medicines is equally unconvincing and 
unconstructive. Patents may be one of many factors attributable to 
inaccessibility, but certainly not the only or major one. The results of 
empirical studies carried out by Attaran in individual countries show that 
drug patents are not a factor at all in some of LDCs because MPCs forgo 
patent protection in these countries due to the fact that annual drug 
spending is US$2 or less per person there and the market is not 
profitable.
130
 ―Poverty‖ has been cited as the most fundamental cause of 
the inaccessibility in those countries as people there cannot even afford the 
cheapest generics.
131
 Lack of price control and lack of incentives to 
produce essential medicines due to low profitability are also factors causing 
the medicine access problem as shown by the examples of India and China. 
The overall status of drug patenting in developing countries also implies a 
lesser role patents play in inaccessibility because, among 319 items on the 
WHO Essential Medicines List (EML), only 17 have basic patents since 
April 1, 1982. And for the 65 developing countries studied, only 1.4% of 
the time patents and patent applications exist for essential medicines, 
therefore ―patents cannot cause essential medicines to be inaccessible in 
‗many‘ developing countries because they do not exist 98.6% of the time,‖ 
although the researcher also cautioned that this norm also has exceptions in 
particular countries (e.g., South Africa) and for particular drugs (e.g., 
antiretroviral drugs) in which case the impact of one patent on one drug or 
more patents in one country ―can be highly significant for public health.‖
132
 
Even for the few patents in some DLCs blocking generic competition, 
balancing schemes such as delayed patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products in DLCs and LDCs, the Bolar-exception, compulsory licensing, 
differential pricing in LDCs, and ―Paragraph 6 system‖ were created within 
the international and national IP system to improve medicine access. 
Whether these schemes can efficiently solve the medicine access problem 
in DLCs is doubted as discussed earlier, but the positive outcomes in India 
(10-year delay in product patent protection), Thailand and Brazil (using 
compulsory licensing to lower drug prices), and Uganda/Canada (using 
―Paragraph 6 system‖ to export ARV drug to LDCs) have proven that the IP 
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system has a self-adjusting ability according to the demand of public 
interest, and such an ability can be enhanced and further developed along 
with the growth of MPCs‘ sense of social responsibility and the willingness 
to cooperate with NGOs and INOs to increases medicine access on the one 
hand, and the increase in awareness and capacity of DLCs in using the 
balancing schemes to negotiate drug prices and prompt their generic 
competitiveness on the other hand. 
C. The Way Forward: Practical Steps in Improving Medicine Access 
Evidence shows that institutional arrangements within the IP system at 
the international level such as the ―Paragraph 6 system‖ have their 
limitations in improving medicine access. There has to be a wider effort 
including poverty reduction, education, price control, or better national 
health policies. Due to space constraints, this article tries only to find some 
practical steps adopted or being considered by MPCs or other organizations 
to improve medicine access, which may be helpful in finding more 
systematic solutions to the problem. 
Despite the widely cited case of 39 pharmaceutical companies 
challenging South Africa‘s medicine legislation and a few other incidences 
putting MPCs under a negative light, more and more MPCs have taken or 
have started to take steps to voluntarily limit or surrender their patent 
monopoly for the benefit of public health. One practice adopted by MPCs 
is ―fair pricing clause in pharmaceutical licensing agreement.‖ For example, 
in February 1998, the NIH invented antiretroviral drug didanosine and 
granted a licence to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) to produce the drug for 
an initial period of 10 years with option of a 5-year extension. The licenses 
included a fair-pricing clause, stating that a fair pricing is available if there 
is ―a reasonable relationship between [the] licensee‘s pricing of [a] licensed 
product and the health and safety needs of the public and . . . this 
relationship [is] supported by evidence.‖
133
 The clause was reportedly not 
properly enforced, nevertheless it is an alternative that could help reduce 
the high price created by patents and promote public access to medicines. 
Some MPCs choose to forgo or not to enforce patents for essential 
medicines. In April 2004, Roche announced that it would not file or enforce 
its patents for ARV drugs in LDCs, and it adopted a ―not-for-profit‖ 
approach to selling its protease inhibitors in LDCs.
134
 The ―not-for-profit‖ 
approach allows Roche to recover its costs for making a drug, but does not 
make a profit on it. Roche said that such moves ―underscore its belief that 
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long-term success requires business to operate in ways that are not only 
economically, but also socially and environmentally sustainable.‖
135
 GSK, 
like Roche, also adopted a ―not-for-profit‖ approach. By 2007, all its ARVs 
are available at not-for-profit prices to the public sector and NGOs in total 
64 LDCs, and all private sectors in sub-Saharan Africa that provide care 
and treatment to their uninsured employees can purchase GSK‘s ARVs at 
not-for-profit prices.
136
 In 2006, GSK further reduced its not-for-profit 
price of Abacavir and added two new ARVs, Kivexa and Telzir, to its 
not-for-profit list.
137
 
Granting a voluntary license to generic manufacturers is a favored 
approach adopted by many MPCs because it benefits both MPCs and 
generic companies. On July 12, 2011, Gilead Sciences, Inc. announced a 
plan to expand its global access program for treatment of HIV/AIDS 
including new licensing terms with four India-based drug manufacturers 
(Hetero Drugs Ltd., Matrix Laboratories Ltd., Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
and Strides Arcolab Ltd.) for three drugs (elvitegravir, cobicistat, ―Quad‖) 
which are currently in late-stage clinical development.
138
 Gilead‘s original 
license agreement grants Indian manufacturers non-exclusive rights to 
produce active pharmaceutical ingredient and finished products and to sell 
generic versions of Gilead‘s HIV medicines Viread and Truvada in 95 
developing countries, and the expanded license agreement allows Indian 
partners to produce and sell the three new drugs if they are approved.
139
 
Gilead has also entered a licensing agreement with the Medicines 
Patent Pool Foundation (MPPF) to license its three new HIV/AIDS drugs. 
The MPPF was established with the support of UNITAID in July 2010, and 
―aims to improve access to affordable and appropriate HIV medicines in 
developing countries through voluntary licensing of critical intellectual 
property.‖
140
 The MPPF is responsible for ―negotiating with patent holders 
to share their IP with the Pool, and then licensing it to other producers to 
facilitate the production of affordable generic medicines well-adapted for 
use in resource-poor settings.‖
141
 In addition to Gilead, the U.S. National 
Health Institute (NIH) has also signed a license agreement with MPPF 
showing the government‘s support for this new initiative. According to 
MPPF, ―the pool is a win-win-win model, whereby patent holders are 
compensated for sharing their patents, generic manufacturers gain access to 
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markets, and patients benefit more swiftly from appropriate and adapted 
medicines at more affordable prices.‖ Whether this model can really 
produce the result envisioned by the foundation still remains to be seen, but 
this is at least another practical solution to the medicine access problem. 
In 2007 and 2008, a new model was being adopted to make 
non-patented anti-malaria drugs available in Africa and South America. A 
non-governmental group, Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), 
formed a partnership with the French pharmaceutical company 
Sanofi-Aventis and Brazilian company Farmanguinhos/Fiocruz, to create 
non-patented anti-malaria drugs such as ASMQ with financial support from 
the EU, MSF, and various national governments such as The Netherlands, 
Spain, and the U.K. Farmanguinhos/Fiocruz then formed a technology 
transfer agreement with India‘s generic company Cipla to transfer 
information on development and production of ASMQ to Cipla.
142
 
Lately, a group of scientists, researchers and organizations in India 
established Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) with a vision ―to 
provide affordable healthcare to the developing world by providing a global 
platform where the best minds can collaborate and collectively endeavor to 
solve the complex problems associated with discovering novel therapies for 
neglected tropical diseases like Malaria, Tuberculosis, Leshmaniasis, 
etc.‖
143
 Some Indian scientists joined the initiative and chose not to patent 
the tuberculosis genome that they mapped out.
144
 
These are some of practical steps that have been taken by MPCs, 
NGOs and national governments to solve medicine access problem. MPCs‘ 
steps demonstrate their willingness and efforts in taking public health into 
consideration when formulating IP strategies. However, as some 
commentators pointed out, MPCs‘ steps are voluntary in nature and can be 
stopped and withdrawn any time.
145
 Some believe that access to essential 
medicines is a component of the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, and suggest imposing legal obligations on MPCs to make essential 
medicines accessible in poor countries.
146
 But how to impose, particularly 
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how to enforce, these legal obligations at the international level is always a 
challenging issue, not to mention that it has been extremely controversial as 
to whether it is appropriate to impose human rights obligations that belong 
to the public domain on private entities. Among all the measures and steps 
described above, DNDi‘s partnership with pharmaceutical companies to 
create non-patented drugs for diseases affecting mostly DLCs and LDCs 
with financial support from international organizations, NGOs and national 
governments may be the best option to solve medicine access problem 
because the financial assistance from various organizations can remedy the 
loss of MPCs from being able to patent the drug, and non-patenting can 
lower drug price, thereby increasing medicine access. After all, requiring 
private commercial companies to give up their rights and interests to fulfill 
a public function is too much to ask as they are not publicly funded and 
have to recover costs and make profits in order to maintain competitiveness. 
Increasing medicine access and solving public health problems in DLCs 
and LDCs requires more participation, particularly from international 
organizations, NGOs and national governments, and collaboration between 
these entities with the pharmaceutical companies to find practical ways that 
can create a win-win situation for all stakeholders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
IP and public health are two sides of the same coin, inseparable and 
mutually dependent, striving for the same goal of promoting the health and 
happiness of humanity. Without IPRs, many medicines essential for human 
health and lives may have never been discovered and developed; in the 
same vein, the IP system and medical sciences may have never been able to 
advance without taking part in R&D and commercialization of the 
medicines essential to public health. Therefore, it is important to perceive 
and construct the relationship between the two sides in a positive, forward 
looking and pragmatic way, rather than mutual condemnation and 
destruction. To do so scholars and practitioners in both fields should 
collaborate to have an in-depth understanding of the issues, objectives, 
schemes and practices in the two fields, and an objective assessment of the 
impact each has exerted, efforts to reconcile, and positive outcomes 
achieved. 
The investigation in this article demonstrates that the IP system has a 
self-adjusting ability to accommodate public interest needs by introducing 
various exceptions (e.g., experimental use, Bolar-exception, compulsory 
licensing, etc.), flexibilities (e.g., special transition arrangement for LDCs 
and developing countries) and practical solutions (e.g., ―Paragraph 6 
system‖). Furthermore, IPRs play different roles in different countries. 
They may only play a very minor or no role at all in the medicine access 
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problem in some LDCs as no drug patent are allowed or filed there. In 
DLCs, on the other hand, the examples of Brazil, Thailand, India and China 
testify that IPRs may be responsible for high drug prices, but they are not 
the sole factor, and that they can be negotiated or completely forgone in 
countries that have good drug price policy and mature 
voluntary/compulsory licensing systems. The studies in this article also 
show that IPRs in the pharmaceutical field can be extended and expanded 
legitimately or illegitimately (e.g., patent term restoration, data exclusivity, 
new use, authorized generics and reverse settlement, evergreening, etc.). 
Hence, in addition to the limitations and flexibilities set within the IP law 
framework, it is also imperative for pharmaceutical companies to fulfill 
their corporate social responsibility and take public health into account in 
formulating their IP strategies. They should find practical ways to work 
with generic companies to help increase accessibility to essential medicines 
in countries suffering a public health pandemic, while maintaining their 
own incentives and resources in discovery and developing essential 
medicines. The steps taken by MPCs such as forgoing patents, 
not-for-profit schemes, fair-price clauses and medicine patents pools are 
positive steps towards this direction. However, it is too much to expect that 
a private pharmaceutical company invests in a costly and lengthy drug 
discovery process and then donates the drug as a public good. Financial 
assistance from international organizations, NGOs and national 
governments to provide incentives and remedies for MPCs to engage in 
R&D of essential drugs, and various forms of licensing arrangements 
between MPCs and generic drug companies are all very important to 
facilitate medicine access and to solve public health problems. 
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